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The brain’s ability to handle sensory information is inﬂuenced by
both selective attention and consciousness. There is no consensus
on the exact relationship between these two processes andwhether
they are distinct. So far, no experiment has simultaneously manipu-
lated both. We carried out a full factorial 2 × 2 study of the simulta-
neous inﬂuences of attention and consciousness (as assayed by
visibility) on perception, correcting for possible concurrent changes
in attention and consciousness. We investigated the duration of
afterimages for all four combinations of high versus low attention
and visible versus invisible. We show that selective attention and
visual consciousness have opposite effects: paying attention to the
gratingdecreases thedurationof its afterimage,whereas consciously
seeing the grating increases the afterimage duration. These ﬁndings
provide clear evidence fordistinctive inﬂuencesof selective attention
and consciousness on visual perception.
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Since the latter part of the past century, interest in the inﬂu-ences of selective attention and consciousness on perception
has steadily increased. This discussion has raised the question of
the relationship between attention and consciousness. By atten-
tion, we refer to selective perceptual attention and not vigilance
or arousal; by consciousness, we refer to the content of con-
sciousness (sometimes also referred to as awareness), and not to
states of consciousness (e.g., wakefulness, dreamless sleep, or
coma). Though some claim that both processes are inextricably
connected (1–4), others suggest a certain level of independence
(5–14). Psychophysical studies show that observers can pay at-
tention to an invisible stimulus (15, 16), and that a stimulus can
be clearly seen in the (near) absence of attention (4, 17). Though
these data could be explained by arguing that these two pro-
cesses covary and therefore any increase (respectively decrease)
in one is associated with a similar but smaller increase (re-
spectively decrease) in the other, this argument fails if attention
and consciousness were to have opposing perceptual effects on
the same stimulus. Finding such opponency would considerably
strengthen the hypothesis that these processes are distinct (5).
Afterimage duration is a well-suited measure for the study of
attention and consciousness. Changes in afterimage durations
reﬂect the attentional and visibility manipulations during the
afterimage induction phase. This permits the temporal separa-
tion of the attentional/visibility manipulations on the afterimage
inducer and their subjective monitoring, and the measurement of
the resultant effects (e.g., on afterimage appearance). This pro-
cedure effectively obviates the need for a simultaneous dual-task
procedure.
Many afterimage and aftereffect studies are devoted to the
inﬂuences of attention or consciousness in isolation. For exam-
ple, removing stimuli from conscious content via various masking
techniques that manipulate visibility decreases the motion af-
tereffect durations (18–20), tilt aftereffect (e.g., ref. 16, but see
ref. 21), and face adaptation (22), and they do so as well for
afterimages (23, 24; but see refs. 25–27). Similarly, attentional
withdrawal decreases the size of the aftereffect for real (16, 28–
30) and illusory lines (31), and for motion (32–36) and face (22)
aftereffects. Curiously, though, attentional withdrawal seems to
increase the duration of afterimages induced by real (37–40) and
illusory adaptors (41). These latter ﬁndings beg the question:
Could attention and consciousness affect perception in different
and experimentally separable ways, even though up to now they
have been found to work synergistically (4, 42)? Note that these
previous ﬁndings cannot answer that question, because they have
not been controlled for confounding concurrent changes in at-
tention and consciousness levels. Therefore their interpretation
in the present context is merely suggestive.
To our knowledge, no experiment to date has probed the si-
multaneous effects of both attention and consciousness on per-
ception, while also controlling for possibly confounding stimulus
and task changes (recently, one study [40] has gone a long way
toward reducing confounding stimulus changes). Therefore, it is
not known whether these two processes can induce different
perceptual effects within a single controlled stimulus set, when
all stimulus parameters and the task structure are identical, and
when attention and visibility levels are not confounded.
We carefully investigated this issue, focusing on the formation of
afterimages.We usedmethods that independently vary the amount
of selective attention and stimulus consciousness. Therefore, even
though until now, attention and consciousness have been shown to
act synergistically (e.g., refs. 4 and 42), we are able to show that
selective attention and stimulus consciousness can have different,
even opposing, effects.
Results
Attention and Visibility Differently Affect Afterimage Duration. In
experiment 1, whilemanipulating attention via a demanding central
task, we simultaneously manipulated the visibility of the stimulus
via perceptual suppression. The independent manipulation of both
allowed us to study high-attention and visible, low-attention and
visible, high-attention and invisible, and low-attention and invisible
conditions (Fig. 1A) using an identical adaptor stimulus and a sin-
gle experimental paradigm.
Attention was manipulated by having subjects perform an at-
tention-demanding central rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP)
task (37, 43, 44; Materials and Methods) that drew attention away
from the inducing stimulus, a gray Gabor patch (a Gaussian-win-
dowed grating; i.e., inducer not/slightly attended), or having sub-
jects report on the possible perceptual disappearances of the
physically present Gabor (i.e., inducer highly attended). Note that
throughout the text, we will refer to conditions where subjects at-
tend to a central task as low-attention condition, in the sense that
the amount of attention available for the adaptor is low (43). To
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maximize the difference between high-attention and low-attention
conditions, subjects did not report the visibility of the Gabor when
they were performing the RSVP task (i.e., no dual task) (31, 45).
We independently manipulated the visibility of the afterimage in-
ducer, which was always presented, by showing (or not) a strongly
competing stimulus in the contralateral eye (23, 24). This contin-
uous ﬂash suppression (CFS) technique renders the Gabor per-
ceptually invisible, even though the stimulus is physically present at
the retina (Fig. 1B).
We ﬁrst veriﬁed that our attentional manipulation worked.
Average performance on the RSVP task was 54 ± 5% correct
when the inducer was visible, and 47 ± 4% when the inducer was
invisible (not signiﬁcant, P > 0.15, two-tailed paired t test). Both
measures were signiﬁcantly higher than chance, 25% (both P <
0.0005, two-tailed t test), but also below 100%, indicating that the
task was demanding. Only correct trials were included in the
following analyses.
We found that afterimage duration (as indicated by the subjects’
button presses) depended on both attention and visibility: paying
attention to the stimulus reduces afterimage duration (frommean±
SEM: 3.36 ± 0.29 s to 3.06 ± 0.35 s in visible conditions, and from
2.02 ± 0.43 s to 1.71 ± 0.42 s in invisible conditions), whereas vis-
ibility of the stimulus increases afterimage duration (from 1.71 ±
0.42 s to 3.06 ± 0.35 s in high-attention conditions, and from 2.02 ±
0.43 s to 3.36 ± 0.29 s in low-attention conditions; Fig. 1C).
This observation is conﬁrmed with a two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA, which showed signiﬁcant main effects of attention (P <
0.001) and visibility (P= 0.006), with no interaction (P > 0.9). Both
of these effects were also signiﬁcant in two-way ANOVAs in four
individual subjects; an additional seven subjects showed a signiﬁ-
cant effect of visibility. Further support for separable inﬂuence of
attention and consciousness comes from comparing the different
conditions separately (Fig. 1D). We found that the attentional ef-
fects are signiﬁcant in both visible and invisible conditions (both
show a decrease of 300 ms, P < 0.021 and P < 0.014, respectively,
paired one-tailed t test). Our observation that attention affects the
processing of invisible stimuli is consistent with a recent fMRI study
(46). Likewise, visibility effects are signiﬁcant in both high- and low-
attention conditions (increases of 1.4 s and 1.3 s, respectively, both
P < 0.001, paired one-tailed t test). Furthermore, there is a strong
correlation between afterimage duration in high- and low-attention
conditions (Spearman rank correlation [over subjects]: ρ = 0.95;
P < 0.001), and also between visible and invisible conditions (ρ =
0.75; P < 0.005), suggesting that the same underlying processes are
responsible for the afterimage production in high- versus low-at-
tention conditions, and visible versus invisible conditions.
Based on our task design, we believe eye movements were un-
likely to inﬂuence these effects in experiment 1 (SI Materials and
Methods; Fig. S1). We also conﬁrmed that the results did not
change when we excluded trials in which subjects reported not
seeing any afterimage (SI Materials and Methods; Fig. S2). These
data clearly show that attention and visibility can have opposite
effects on visual perception, and that these effects do not
interact signiﬁcantly.
Control for Task Differences.Although our comparison of high- and
low-attention conditions was based on similar conditions, the at-
tention task during the adaptation, as well as during the afterim-
age monitoring, differed (the subject had to remember a number
in the low-attention condition, which was not required in the high-
attention condition).
In experiment 2a, attention to the inducer was manipulated by
making a single central RSVP task more or less difﬁcult (47)
(Materials and Methods). We conﬁrmed that the attentional ma-
nipulation worked: performance on theRSVP task was 80± 8% in
the easy task and 61± 5% in the hard task (P < 0.01, paired t test).
Again, we found a signiﬁcant effect of attention and visibility (Fig.
2). A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed signiﬁcant
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Fig. 1. Experiment 1. (A) Our study used a 2× 2 full-factorial design, independentlymanipulating the levels of attention and visibility. (B) Each trial startedwith
4-s peripheral adaptation of a Gabor patch. Attention was modulated by having observers report on the perceptual (dis)appearance of the inducer (high-
attention condition) or count thenumberofXs that appeared ina central RSVP task (low-attention condition). Perceptual visibilitywasmodulatedby showing, or
not showing, a rapidlyﬂickering and rotating high-contrast stimulus in the eye contralateral to the afterimage inducer, while the adaptorwas physically present
throughout the trial (23). After the induction phase, observers indicated how long their afterimage lasted, by pressing and releasing a button. Finally, they
entered howmany Xswere counted (or they ignored the question in the high-attention conditions). (C) Afterimage durations depend on visibility and attention
levels (n = 13 subjects; each subject has a different color). When the inducer stimulus is highly attended, afterimages are shorter than when the stimulus is not/
slightly attended (in both visible and invisible conditions). Visible trials have longer afterimage durations than invisible trials, for both high-attention and low-
attention conditions. (D) A table with mean ± SEM afterimage durations, and P values of statistical comparisons based on paired one-tailed t tests.
8884 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0913292107 van Boxtel et al.
effects of attention (P < 0.01) and visibility (P < 0.03), and no
interaction (P > 0.15). The effect of attention was signiﬁcant in
both visible and invisible cases (P < 0.030 and P < 0.021, re-
spectively, paired one-tailed t tests), and the effect of visibility was
signiﬁcant under both high and low attention (both P < 0.001).
Therefore, when the task structure was kept identical, and only
perceptual load on the central task differed, increased attention to
the inducer reduced afterimage duration.
In experiment 2b, we reran experiment 2a on 10 subjects (of
which four participated in the previous version as well) while
monitoring their eye movements. Eyemovements can potentially
inﬂuence our data in three ways: (i) small eye-movements will
jitter the stimulus on the retina, thereby decreasing adaptation
(48) and consequently reducing afterimage duration; (ii) subjects
might keep ﬁxation at the central task when it is difﬁcult, while
ﬁxating the peripheral stimulus when the central task is easy,
potentially introducing a confound; and (iii) eye movements
during the induction phase might cause the interocular sup-
pression to fail (49), thereby making the stimulus visible when it
should be invisible. When analyzing subjects’ eye movements, we
found no correlation between SDs in eye position parallel or
orthogonal to the stimulus orientation and the afterimage du-
ration, (control for point i above; SI Materials and Methods). We
excluded trials in which subjects did not ﬁxate the ﬁxation mark,
and trials in which a saccade was detected (control for points ii
and iii).With these controls in place, the results (Fig. S3) conﬁrm
that attention decreased afterimage duration, whereas visibility
increased afterimage duration [repeated-measures ANOVA:
main effects of attention (P = 0.03) and visibility (P = 0.005),
with no interaction (P > 0.25)].
Attention and Visibility Effects over a Range of Contrasts. Are our
visibility ﬁndings simply due to the strong interocular suppressor?
In experiment 3, wemeasured the effects of attention and visibility
on afterimage duration while varying the contrast of the sup-
pressing CFS. The CFS contrast ranged from 0% (i.e., no CFS) to
perithreshold (1.6–6.3%) to suprathreshold (12.5–100%) contrast
values; the inducing Gabor patch contrast was ﬁxed at 34%.
The effects of CFS (compared with the 0% contrast, no CFS
condition) are signiﬁcant (P < 0.05, one-tailed t test) for contrasts
>6%and>12% for high- and low-attention conditions, respectively
(Fig. 3A), which is also the contrast when it was strong enough to
cause visibility changes in the inducer stimulus. The effect of in-
creased attention (ΔAI) was signiﬁcant (i.e., P < 0.05, one-tailed t
test) for CFS with 0% contrast, and for contrasts >12% (Fig. 3B).
Therefore, our conclusions in experiment 1 are not just the result of
the speciﬁc settings of the CFS stimulus.
We fail to see signiﬁcant attentional effects with CFS at peri-
threshold contrasts of 1.6–6.3%(Fig. 3B). It is nowwell established
that stimuli around the detection threshold attract attention (50,
51). Therefore, the perithreshold CFS stimuli probably attracted
the subjects’ attention, even when the distracting RSVP task was
performed. This explains why at these contrasts the low-attention
conditions fall on top of the attended conditions (as if they were
“highly attended” conditions; Fig. 3A).
Controls for Stimulus Differences. Could the mere presence or
absence of the CFS stimulus have caused our visibility effects?
Conceivably, interocular masking could increase contrast adap-
tation, thereby increasing detection thresholds and, ultimately,
reducing afterimage durations (40, 52, 53). However, we already
showed that qualitatively identical and signiﬁcant results are
obtained at CFS mask Michelson contrasts as low as ∼10% (see
previous section). To more stringently control for the possible
inﬂuences of CFS and contrast threshold increases on visibility,
we performed an experiment in which subjects always viewed the
same Gabor, and the same CFS mask.
In experiment 4, the contrast of the CFS mask was determined
for each subject, such that in about half of all trials the afterimage-
inducing Gabor patch was perceptually invisible, whereas in the
remaining half the Gabor was visible to a variable extent. Because
all conditions were otherwise identical (including the CFS stim-
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Fig. 2. Experiment 2: Changing perceptual load. The amount of attention
paid to the afterimage-inducing stimulus was manipulated by using a difﬁ-
cult or easy RSVP task at ﬁxation, leading to low- and high-attention con-
ditions respectively. (A) Increased attention to the inducer stimulus led to
decreased afterimage durations, whereas increased visibility led to increased
afterimage durations (both P < 0.03, two-way repeated-measures ANOVA).
(B) A table with mean ± SEM afterimage durations, and P values of statistical
comparisons based on paired one-tailed t tests.
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Fig. 3. Effects of CFS contrast. (A) The CFSmask started to have a suppressing
effect on afterimagedurations at contrasts higher than∼6%. This is alsowhen
the mask started to have effects on the visibility of the afterimage inducer,
which was kept at a ﬁxed contrast of 34%. (B) The difference in afterimage
duration between high- and low-attention conditions. The effects of atten-
tion were present without suppressor CFS (i.e., zero contrast), and for CFS
contrasts larger or equal to 12%. Stars represent signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level
for one-tailed t tests, e.g., P < 0.025 for 0% and 100% contrast. Bars are SEM.
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ulus), the sole variantwas perceptual visibility. The data conﬁrmed
the previous experiments: visible trials led to longer afterimages
(1.79 ± 0.23 s) than invisible trials (1.52 ± 0.27 s, P= 0.02, paired
one-tailed t test, also signiﬁcant in 8/10 individual subjects; Fig.
4A). An auxiliary linear regression (Fig. 4B; SI Materials and
Methods) showed a slope of 0.13 (R2 = 0.96, P < 0.001), leading
to a 0.51-s increase in afterimage duration for 4 s—the trial du-
ration—of visibility. Furthermore, there was a signiﬁcant corre-
lation between the individual subjects’ effects of visibility in this
experiment and in experiment 1 (ρ = 0.67, P < 0.05), suggesting
that the same process was at work.
In experiment 5, we removed the CFS stimulus altogether, and
decreased the inducer contrast to 6%, such that intermittent
peripheral Troxler fading occurred (54). This fading caused trial-
by-trial variations in stimulus visibility. Again we found that the
longer the perceptual visibility of the inducer, the longer the
afterimage (Fig. 5, linear regression: R2 = 0.8, P < 0.005, slope =
0.25, leading to a 1.0-s increase in afterimage duration for 4 s—
the trial duration—of visibility).
Experiments 4 and 5 conﬁrm that perceptual visibility (i.e.,
whether the subject is conscious of the stimulus) is a signiﬁcant
factor in afterimage formation above and beyond the physical
presence of the adaptor. The presence or absence of CFS affects
afterimage duration mainly, although perhaps not solely, through
the manipulation of perceptual visibility.
Discussion
The relationship between selective attention and consciousness
has been much debated since the 19th century. We here address
this important question via a direct comparison on the basis of
a full-factorial 2 × 2 design of afterimage perception, while
controlling for the effects of stimulus and task differences, and
eye movements. We show that paying more attention to the in-
ducer invariably shortens afterimage duration, while increasing
the visibility of the inducer increases afterimage duration com-
pared with invisibility. Clearly, selective attention and stimulus
consciousness have separable effects on perception, as reviewed
previously (5, 7), and, in the context of afterimages, may even
have opposite effects. It will be important to investigate the ex-
tent to which such a full-factorial design can show dissociations
between attention and consciousness for other perceptual phe-
nomena [a recent study used a full-factorial design in priming
(55), but did not observe opposite effects of attention and con-
sciousness].
Why would selective attention and consciousness have oppos-
ing effects when so often both act synergistically (4, 42)? What
seems paradoxical is that attending to the inducer will reduce the
duration of the afterimage. The effects of consciousness (visibil-
ity) are straightforward to explain: visible inducers evoke larger
neuronal activity during induction of afterimages than invisible
ones, resulting in stronger and longer afterimages, compared with
invisible inducers. This is consistent with other forms of after-
effects (16, 18–20, 22) and with general ﬁndings in neurophysi-
ology (e.g., ref. 56).
The counterintuitive nature of the attentional effects is a bit
more difﬁcult to explain. Suzuki and Grabowecky (37) suggested
that afterimages are the result of adaptation in two stages. The
ﬁrst stage is sensitive to the contrast polarity of the image. This
stage cares about the spatial relationship between dark and light
regions of a stimulus (it could, for example, increase its response
when presented with a patch that is dark on one side and light on
the other side, but not to a patch with the reverse contrast po-
larity). This stage is the source of the afterimage, because when it
is adapted and stimulated with a neutral stimulus, it will produce
an afterimage of opposite polarity to the afterimage inducer. In
Suzuki and Grabowecky’s framework, this stage is not critically
affected by attention. Although a later study (40) did indicate
that both attention and consciousness change adaptation states
at this level, Suzuki and Grabowecky’s general framework re-
mains plausible.
The second stage is not sensitive to the contrast polarity of
the image. It will be activated by a patch that is dark on one side
and light on the other side, and also a patch of reverse contrast-
polarity, as long as the stimulus has the preferred orientation and
position. This stage will modulate the strength of the subsequently
perceived afterimage (40, 52, 53): when activity in this stage is high,
the afterimage is strong, when activity is low, the afterimage is
weak or absent. During the adaptation phase, polarity-insensitive
cells will adapt more in the presence of selective attention, re-
ducing their activity during the afterimage phase. Subsequently,
this will cause the afterimages to be weaker if attention is paid
during the induction phase. In this scheme, adaptation works in
opposite directions in polarity-sensitive and polarity-insensitive
cells. The opposite effects of attention and consciousness in our
experiments can be explained if they affect adaptation at these
levels differently. A computationalmodel based on such principles
reproduces the psychophysical effects of attention (38). Neuro-
physiological studies also support this idea: though attention
modulates the ﬁring rates of neurons in early visual areas (57, 58),
perceptual invisibility in binocular rivalry has little effect on their
ﬁring activities (59–63). Clearly, attention and consciousness have
different ways of inﬂuencing early visual activity, which, as we have
pointed out, may cause opposing effects on afterimage duration.
There is at least one other explanation for why attention shows
these paradoxical effects. We assume a single stage that is more
adapted when attention is directed to the stimulus. By itself, this
predicts a stronger afterimage in high-attention condition. We fur-
thermore assume that the afterimage decays with a time constant of
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several seconds (25, 64), and that increased levels of selective at-
tention reduce this time constant. Thismeans that a neuron that has
been modulated by increased levels of attention will return quicker
froman adapted state to baseline (i.e., reduced time constants) than
a neuron not modulated by attention. The shunting effects of syn-
aptic conductancechanges (65), in combinationwith local excitatory
feedback, gives rise to effective time constants in the range of sec-
onds (66, 67), which has the correct order of magnitude to underlie
afterimages and the seemingly paradoxical effect of attention.
Although detrimental effects of attention are rare, they are not
unheard of. Other examples of negative inﬂuences of attention
include the expression of overlearnt skills in motor learning (68,
69), texture segregation (70), and recognition memory (71). One
commonality among all four is the involvement of peripheral
neuronal structures that might well be amenable to modulation by
selective attention but not by consciousness. In that sense, our
ﬁndings are fully compatible with the predictions of global work-
space theories of consciousness (7, 72).
When attention is withdrawn, even salient stimuli can become
perceptually invisible. From that perspective it may seem puzzling
that we observed opposite effects when comparing low attentional
processing with invisibility due to perceptual rivalry. A failure to
report on a stimulus that is physically present can be induced by
different psychophysical techniques (73). In particular, invisibility
can be induced by perceptual suppression, such as CFS (e.g., ref.
23) or backward masking (e.g., ref. 74), or by inattention, such as
inattentional blindness (4) or change blindness (42). Though the
neurophysiological operations underlying perceptual invisibility
remain unclear, some evidence suggests that perceptual sup-
pression and inattentional blindness are supported by similar
mechanisms (75, 76). Our ﬁndings are inconsistent with such
a framework, arguing instead for distinct mechanisms. Further-
more, a recent report (77) demonstrated that subjects’ conﬁdently
report stimulus absence (i.e., miss) during perceptual suppression
but not during attentional distraction. The results were quantiﬁed
using type-2 signal detection theory (78). These studies imply
different neuronal mechanisms for perceptual suppression (pos-
sibly due to suppressed sensory activity in the ventral visual
pathway) (76) and for inattentional invisibility (possibly due to
a failure of top-down attentional ampliﬁcation of sensory signals
from frontal-parietal cortex) (7, 75).
Our experiments show that selective attention and stimulus
consciousness affect the perception of afterimages differently, and
even oppositely. As pointed out previously (74), this makes it all
the more critical to distinguish the neuronal correlates of selective
attention from those of the current content of consciousness.
Materials and Methods
Stimuli. Adaptation was induced by presenting a 0.23 cycles/°, 34%Michelson
contrast, Gaussian-windowed (σ = 1.43°), randomly oriented grating, located
4.9° peripherally. Presentation was monocular, and balanced over the eyes
over trials. This Gabor was always presented throughout the induction pe-
riod (4 s). The suppressor stimulus was a Gaussian-windowed (σ = 1.43°)
checkerboard (0.78 cycles/°) which rotated at 150°/s, and reversed contrast
every 67ms. The contrast of this suppressor stimuluswas 100% in experiments
1, 2a, and 2b, systematically varied in experiment 3, tailored for each subject
in experiment 4 (for 8/10 of the subjects it was set to 9%, for 2/10 subjects it
was set to 20%), and 0% for experiment 5. At subsequent trials, the Gabor
was shifted around the ﬁxation dot in counterclockwise fashion by 45°, pre-
venting repeated adaptation at a single location. Depending on afterimage
durations, and delays between subsequent trials, this leads to at least 30 s
(generally >50 s) of deadaptation between adaptation periods at identical
locations. Background luminance was 49 cd/m2. All experiments were per-
formed on a gamma-corrected monitor.
Procedure. In experiment 1, in the low-attention trials, attention was dis-
tracted from the afterimage-inducing stimulus by having subjects perform
a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task. We used RSVP of letters (red
Helvetica 12-point), which were shown (133ms, no interletter interval) within
the boundaries of the ﬁxation dot. Subjects had to count the number of Xs
(n = 2–5), which was reported after the afterimage had disappeared. In the
high-attention trials, the RSVP task was not performed (but the letters were
shown). Instead, subjects tracked the subjective visibility of the inducer by
pressing and releasing a button. Subjects did not report visibility in the low-
attention trials, avoiding the need to employ attention to the inducer (in
standard dual-task paradigms, subjects are forced to attend to the stimulus).
After the adaptation period, subjects indicated the duration of the after-
image with a button press and release. In experiments 1, 2a, 3, 4, and 5, when
subjects perceived no afterimage, they pressed a separate button, in which
case the duration of the afterimage was recorded as being 0 s in duration.
Experiment 2b had no such button, and subjects merely had to quickly re-
lease the button with which the afterimage duration was indicated.
In experiment 2a and 2b, we manipulated attentional load. The attention-
demanding central RSVP task was to count the number of times (n = 1, 2, 3, or
4) a cross (height: 1.9°, width: 1.4°) of a particular orientation and color
appeared. Crosses were presented at ﬁxation for 133 ms and blanked for
133 ms. Two target crosses were at least separated by one other cross. The
easy task was to count the upright and inverted red crosses. The hard task
was to count the number of upright yellow and inverted green crosses (but
not the opposite conjunction). According to the load theory of attention
(43), in trials with the easy task the observer had more “free” attention to
direct to the inducer than in trials with the hard task. Therefore, without
changing the task or the stimuli, we could change the amount of attention
paid to the afterimage inducer. An additional advantage of this experiment
is that eye movements are highly unlikely to differ between the different
conditions (47), which we empirically conﬁrmed in experiment 2b.
Information on the number of trials, the trial inclusion criteria, and the eye
movements can be found in SI Materials and Methods.
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